mystic-prelogic mode of thinkingthatlargelyconsistsofreligiousand supernatural elements. It was therefore impossible to describe this modeofthinkingwithlogic-basedrulesortomakeitcompatiblewith theCartesian mode of thinking,whichhebelievedtobecharacteristic ofEuropeans.Inhislateryears,Lévy-Bruhlpartiallywithdrewthis position.However,amodifiedversion,accordingtowhichtwomodes ofthinkingarestilldistinguished-sometimestermedasrule-basedvs. associative,reflectivevs.intuitive,orabstractvs.content-specific-yet assumedtoco-existinallcultures,isstilldiscussedinresearchonthinkingandreasoning,albeitcontroversially(e.g., Sloman,1996; Sperber, 1997; BellerandSpada,2003; Evans,2003; forarelateddiscussion, seealsoNisbettetal.,2001; Norenzayanetal.,2002; Nisbett,2003) .
Theconceptionofthe "psychicunityofhumankind,"incontrast, holdsthat,irrespectiveoftheirculturalbackground,allhumans haveattheirdisposalthesamecognitivetoolkit.Datingbackatleast totheEnlightenment,thispositionexperiencedahugeupliftinthe 1950sand1960s,whenthecognitiverevolutionlaidthefoundation foranewfield (Miller,2003) .Severaldisciplines-amongthem psychologyandculturalanthropology-joinedforcestoexplore thefoundationsofthehumanmindanditsachievements (foroverviews,seeGardner,1985; Boden,2006) .Notonlydidtheysharea commongoal,buttheydidsofromaperspectivethatfocusedon mentalstates,whicharegeneratedandalteredbywayofinformationinput,processing,storage,andtransmission.Accordingtoa popular metaphor, information processing in a human mind is analogoustoinformationprocessingthattakesplaceinacomputer, consistsofalgorithmsanddataandvarieswithregardtoinputand output,butnotwithregardtoprocessingitself.Weassumethatit wasthiscomputer metaphorthatgaverisetothefollowingthree basic-althoughoftenimplicit-assumptions (seealsoBlock,1995; NorenzayanandHeine,2005) :
(1) Cognitioncanbesplitintoprocessingandcontent(i.e.,the informationbeingprocessed). (2) Cognition takes place in people's heads, which implies that processingislargelyindependentofcontext. (3) Only content varies across cultures, whereas the processor itself, and hence the processing, are universal, that is, independentofpeople'sculturalbackground.
Forresearchonhumancognition,theseassumptionsentailfarreachingconsequences.First,theassumedseparabilityofprocess andcontentseemedtojustifyadivisionoflaboraccordingtowhich anthropologywouldaccountfortheconcreteculturalcontentof mentalrepresentations,andpsychologywouldaccountfortheir cognitive processing (D'Andrade, 1981, p. 182) . In recent years, though,thisdistinctionturnedouttobeneitherreasonablenor tenable (MedinandAtran,2004; Bangetal.,2007) Second,thefocusinearlycognitivescienceonmental phenomena iscomprehensibleifoneconsidersthatitoriginatedascountermovementtobehaviorism(cf. Gardner,1985) .Whereasbehaviorismcategoricallyrejectedtheusabilityofmentalconstructsdue totheirinaccessibilityfordirectobservation,thenewdiscipline realizedthatbehaviorcouldonlybeaccountedforifoneunderstandswhatpeopleareattendingtoandwhatinformationthey areprocessing.Forcognitivescientistsandanthropologistsalike thissetthepath:"Wemustgetinsideoursubjects'heads" (Frake, 1964,p.133) . Thedownsideofthisconcentrationonmentalphenomenawas a disregard for other factors with potential influence on cognitiveprocessing.Arangeofcognitiveactivitiesarenotexclusively performedinternally,butratherininteractionwithone'senvironmentandwithartifacts,whichoftenservepreciselythepurposeof facilitatingcognitiveprocessing(e.g., Norman,1993) .Instructive examplesofthisinteractionaretheusageofdigitsforcalculations (Nickerson,1988; ZhangandNorman,1995) orofmapsandtechnicalinstrumentsinnavigation (Hutchins,1995) .Fortheincorporationofcognitiveartifactsintocognitiveprocessing, Hutchins (2006) coinedtheterm"distributedcognition."Evenbeyondconcretetools,thecontextinwhichweprocessinformationmayaffect howweprocessit,particularlywithregardtowhether(andwhich) otherpeoplearepresent.Onesimpleexampleofthiseffectissocial facilitation(i.e.,increasingindividualperformanceonsimpletasks whenothersarepresent),whichhasactuallybeenknownforatleast acentury (BondandTitus,1983; Guerin,1993) .Toensuretheir externalvalidity,thecommonpracticeofexaminingcognitiveprocessesundercontrolledconditionsinlabsisthereforerathercritical.
Yet,thispreferenceforcontrolledexperimentsoncognitionhas beenreinforcedbythethirdassumption,accordingtowhichcognitiveprocessesareuniversal,thatis,independentofpeople'scultural background.Supportforthisassumptionevenseemedtocome fromcognitiveanthropology,which,initsearlydays,hadfound evidenceforuniversalprinciplesoforganizingcognitivedomains (e.g., Berlinetal.,1968; BerlinandKay,1969; Berlin,1992) .Hence, uptotheendofthelastcentury,thepotentialofculturetoaffect cognitiveprocesseshasbeenwidelyignored(cf.Norenzayanand Heine, 2005; Bang et al., 2007; Henrich et al., 2010b) , and this seemedtojustifythewidespreadhabitofexploringcognitiveprocesseswithselectivesamples,namelygraduatestudentsofone'sown university.Afterall,ifcognitiveprocessesareuniversal,eachstudent shouldbeasgoodasubjectfortheirexplorationasanybodyelse. Thesameholdsforstudiesinpsycholinguistics(cf. Harley,2008) , whichwerelargelybasedontheassumptionthatlanguagehasno effectoncognitionandhencewerealltoooftencontentwiththe English language and its speakers.And again, if one adopts the Chomskyanideaofauniversalgrammar,Englishshouldbeasgood atestingbedforitsexplorationasanyotherlanguage.
Buthowcanweascertainthattheseprocessesareindeeduniversalifwedonottestforuniversality?
cultural variance and challenges for research
Criticisminthisregardisfarfromnew,buthasgainedincreasing attention in recent years. As Arnett (2008) (p.25; andseeGeertz,1974; Bloch,1998) . Toputitmoretechnically:Anthropologistspreferanemicanalysis, basedonthecategoriesfrominsidethesystem,overtheeticanalysis (Pike,1967; andseeHeadlandetal.,1990; Berry,1999) .
Anthropology,however,onceapioneerdisciplineandafoundingmemberofthecognitivesciences (Gardner,1985; D'Andrade, 1995) ,hasincreasinglywithdrawnfromthemutualendeavorduringthelastdecadesandismeanwhileconsideredthe"missingdiscipline"incognitivescience (Boden,2006) .Severalreasonshave beenidentifiedforthisalienation,anddivergingmethodological preferencesareamongthemostimportant (Benderetal.,2010b; Boster,2011) .Nevertheless,inadditiontothedistinctperspective justmentioned,thereareatleastthreemorereasonswhyanthropologywouldstill-andindeed,moresothanever-beaninvaluable partnerforcognitivesciences,andwhyeffortstore-integratethe formerintothelatterneedtobeintensified.
First,aswe haveseen,the division oflabor between thedisciplineswasneverreallyconduciveinthefirstplace;separating cognitiveprocessesandculturalcontentdoesnotdojusticetothe topic.Ifweassumethatcognitiveprocessesareaffectedbycontent, informationonculturalvariationincontentisimportantforamore comprehensiveunderstandingofprocessing(foranexample,see AtranandMedin,2008) .Forabroadrangeofcultures,anthropologistshavebeencollectingdataoncognitivecontentthatneed tobeconsidered.
Inaddition,anthropologybringstothetableitsexpertiseoncultureingeneralasaheuristicconcept.Thisentailsnotonlyaheightenedawarenessofhome-fielddisadvantagesandcontinuousefforts forovercomingthemasoutlinedabove(cf., WellerandRomney, 1988; Headlandetal.,1990; Agar,1996; Ross,2004; Bernard,2006) , butalsoabroaderperspectiveonwhatcultureisinthefirstplace. Theincreasinginterestincognitivescienceforculture'sconstitutive roleinhumancognitionhasspurredanincreasingnumberofcrossculturalandcross-linguisticstudies.Alltoooften,however,these studies tend to reduce culture to simple, dichotomous variables, EnglishspeakingandEuropeancountries,butalsowithsamples fromthesesamecountries.Inthisrespect,researchersneglected roughly95%oftheworldpopulation,aboutwhich-fromapsychologicalandcognitivescienceperspective-weknowpractically nothing(seealsoHenry,2008).Theheavilyresearched5%,on theotherhand,belongto"TheWEIRDestpeopleintheworld" (Henrichetal.,2010b)inadoublesense:Theyarefrom"Western, Educated,Industrialized,Rich,andDemocraticsocieties,"and, inglobalcomparison,theymustbeconsideredapsychological outlier.Withnumerousexamples,rangingfromvisualperception through spatial cognition, ethnobiological concepts, and economic decision-making, to self-concept and various social phenomena, Henrich et al. (2010b) demonstrate that many of theeffectspreviouslyassumedtoberobustanduniversaloccur onlyweaklyornotatallwhensamplingbeyondWEIRDpeople (similarobservationsholdforlinguisticuniversals;cf.,Evansand Levinson,2009 ).
Thisisnottosaythatsuchuniversalsdonotexist.Giventhe currentresearchpractice,however,onlyfewoftheassumeduniversalscanberegardedassufficientlyestablished.Exploringcognitivediversitythusremainsafundamentalgoalforallcognitive sciences,andhasbecomeoneofthehottopicsinthefield (Cohen, 2001; NorenzayanandHeine,2005; Lloyd,2007; Gentner,2010) . Meanwhile,conclusiveevidencefordeepculturalimpactsnotonly on cognition, but on the very architecture of the brain, is even providedbyneuroscience(AmbadyandBharucha,2009;Kitayama andUskul,2011),whichofalldisciplines,istheonethatmighthave beenassociatedthemostwithuniversalclaimsfromtheoutset,as itisperceivedbymanynon-expertsasnotonlyreducingcognitiontoalgorithmsbuttotheveryhardwareoftheprocessor:the neurons(cf. Gardner,1985) .Yet,neuroscienceincreasinglyprovides evidencefortheassumptionthatthebrainisalteredbylearning andexperience,whichitselfisorganizedbyculture.
However, while cross-cultural research is indispensable for scrutinizingcognitivediversity,itisadelicatethingtodo.Some ofthesubtledifficultiesarisefromwhatMedinetal. (2010)dub "home-fielddisadvantages."Thefirsthome-fielddisadvantageisa tendencytoleaveoneoftheculturesundercomparisonunmarked, thereby taking it as the standard from which others deviate; as oneconsequenceofthis,peculiaritiesoftheunmarkedculturefall preytoculturalblindspots.Thesecondhome-fielddisadvantage is a tendency to consider other cultures (and occasionally even whole hostsofcultures) asmore homogeneousthan one'sown culture,anddefinitelyasmorehomogeneousthantheyactually are. This becomes most obvious when all NativeAmericans are lumpedtogetheras"theIndians,"orChinese,Japanese,andSouth Koreansarereferredtoas"theEastAsians."Thethirdhome-field disadvantageisanexcessivetrustintheequivalenceoftasksacross cultures.Thisraisesatleasttwoconcerns:aconcernwithhowthese tasksareunderstoodindifferentculturalcontexts(e.g.,Astutiand Bloch,2010) andhowtheresponsescaleshavetobeinterpreted (e.g.,Heineetal.,2002),andaconcernwithwhattheobtained datawouldbeabletoreveal.Asmosttasksarespecificallytailored tobringaboutaspecificeffectinthecultureforwhichtheywere developed, regression toward the mean demands that in other conditions-andthisimpliesinothercultures-thiseffectwill belesslikelytoshowupwiththesametask (Medinetal.,2010) .
Accordingtoourownexperience,thereislittlethatissosupportive of a constructive exchange across disciplines as the willingness to jointlyaddresscommonresearchquestionsandgoals.Inthecaseof cognitiveresearch,itshouldnotbetoodifficulttoaccomplishthis.One promisingstartingpointmightbetoplaceontothesharedresearch agendatheverytopicsuponwhichthevariousdisciplinesappearto disagree:Fromaseriousdiscussionoftheconceptualizationofcultureanditsimplications,throughmethodologicalissues,toacritical examinationofuniversals.Crucially,however,thisendeavorshould notbeundertakenonanabstractlevel,butneedstobegroundedin aconcretecognitivedomainandcoupledtoprecisequestions(evenif thesequestionsmayhavetoberephrasedinthecourseofcollaboration).Itwillalsorequireidentifyingthelevelatwhicheachdiscipline willdiscussthephenomenonunderscrutiny,andagain,thedifferent disciplinescancomplementeachotherinthisrespect,withcognitivepsychologycontributingaperspectiveonindividualprocessing andtendenciesofpopulations,andanthropologistscontributinga perspectiveonthecontentandcontextofcognitionininteractions.
A few cases of good practice provide evidence that crossdisciplinary collaboration can not only work well, but may be prosperousingivingrisetonewandinnovativeresearch.Among the most convincing examples are the work on ethnobiological andecologicalcognitionandbehaviorconductedbytheteamof DouglasMedinandScottAtranatNorthwestern University(e.g., MedinandAtran,2004; Medinetal.,2006; AtranandMedin,2008) andtheworkoninteractionsoflanguage,cultureandcognition inStephenLevinson'sresearchgroupattheMax Planck Institute for Psycholinguistics in Nijmegen (e.g., Majid et al., 2004 Majid et al., , 2007 EnfieldandLevinson,2006; Haunetal.,2006) .Otherinstances includeresearchonnumericalcognition (WassmannandDasen, 1994; Picaetal.,2004; Dehaeneetal.,2006 Dehaeneetal., ,2008 BellerandBender, 2008 ),oncausalandtemporalreasoning(Belleretal.,2009 Bender etal.,2010a) ,onthecognitivefoundationsofreligionandconcepts ofanafterlife (Blochetal.,2001; Astutietal.,2004; Whitehouse andMcCauley,2005; AstutiandHarris,2008) ,ontheoryofmind (Wassmann et al., 2010) , and on decision-making and rules of fairnessinsocialdilemmasituations (Henrichetal.,2005 (Henrichetal., ,2010a .
Institutional attempts to support cross-disciplinary collaboration include the International Cognition and Culture Institute (ICCI), which provides a web-based platform for exchange, the Culture and the Mind projectattheUniversityofSheffield,which investigatesthecognitiveandevolutionaryfoundationsofculture anditsimpactonthemind,andtheCenter for Interdisciplinary Research(ZiF)ofBielefeldUniversity,whichprovidesfundingfor interdisciplinary residentialgroups.Oneofthesegroups(taking residencein2011/2012)isspecificallydesignedasaplatformfor re-integrating anthropology into the cognitive sciences and will focusontheculturalconstitutionofcausalcognition.
These instances for communication and even cooperation between anthropology and the wider cognitive sciences are still theexceptionratherthantherule,andalotofworkremainstobe done.Nevertheless,thepotentialforsynergisticeffectsisremarkable,andtheneedforenhancedcross-disciplinarycollaborationis increasinglyacknowledgedacrossdisciplines.Ifcognitivescience strivesforacomprehensiveunderstandingofhumancognition,it needstoconsiderandintegratetheperspectiveofferedbyanthropologyontheculturalconstitutionofcognition. such as individualism vs. collectivism (for overview and critical assessments, cf., Fiske, 2002; Oyserman et al., 2002) . Still largely neglectedareinteractionsbetweencognitionandcultureinthesense ofacognitiveecology (Cole,1996; Shweder,2007; Hutchins,2010) .
And finally, the diverging methodological approaches of the disciplinescouldprovidevaluablecomplements-providedthat theymanagetoovercomethereservationstheyholdagainsteach other's preferences. Despite the fact that cognitive science and anthropologyshareacommongoal,theyneverthelesstakedivergingperspectives,withregardtobothfocusandmethods (foran extensivetreatment,seeBoster,2011; MishraandDasen,2007) . Mostcognitivesciences,andparticularlysopsychology,areprimarilyinterestedinhowcognitiveprocessesoperateandhowtheyare relatedtoeachother.Thisinterestsuggestsananalyticalfocuson theindividual.Thepreferredmethodistheexperiment,asitallows potentiallyinterferingfactorstobeeliminatedtoalargeextent,thus enabling the"pure" process to be scrutinized, which is essential inordertouncovercausalmechanismsofcognitivephenomena. Cognitiveanthropology,ontheotherhand,isprimarilyinterested inculturalmeaninginamoreholisticmanner,thusfocusingon how cultural knowledge of groups of persons is organized and described, transmitted and modified. As most anthropologists conceiveofculturenotonlyastheorigin (Tomasello,1999) ,but alsoasanintegralpartofcognition (D'Andrade,1981; Hutchins, 1995; Shore,1996) ,theyembedsystematicdatacollectioninfield studieswithparticipantobservation (Agar,1996) .
Atfirstglance,thesemethodologicalapproachesappeartobe mutuallyexclusive.AsBoster(2011)elegantlyputsit,"cognitive psychologists examine trees and cognitive anthropologists contemplateforests."Amorethoroughexamination,however,reveals that in taking different angles, they are indeed complementary. Usedtogether,theycompensateforeachother'sweaknesseswith theirdistinctstrengths,thuspavingthewayforsynergiesbeyond whatcouldbeachievedbyeachdisciplinealone (BellerandBender, 2010) .Inordertoobtainacomprehensiveunderstandingofhuman cognition (including its cultural constitution), combining these approacheswillbeinevitable.Onecriticalprerequisiteformaking useofthiscomplementarity,however,isknowledgeofandrespect forthemethodologicalprinciplesoftherespectiveotherdiscipline.
the case for collaboration and cases of good Practice
Collaborationacrossdisciplinesisencumberedwithahostofdifficulties,includingdifferentbackgroundsintermsofknowledge, distincttheoreticalconceptualizationsandvocabulary,diverging researchparadigmsandmethodologicalapproaches,anddifferent practicalhabits.Forinstance,psychologistsareusedtoconducting researchinteamsandtopublishingtheirresultsjointly,whereas anthropologists typically work in"their field" all by themselves, whichisthenreflectedintheirpublications.Establishingrespective cooperationishencenosimpleendeavor.Andonlyiftheymutuallyacknowledgeandrespecteachother'sresearchtraditionswill theybepreparedtoinvesttherequiredeffort.Inducingresearchersfromdifferenttraditionstocollaboratewillrequiremorethan simplymakinganappealtodoso,andanybodywithexperiencein interdisciplinaryworkwillbewellawareofthepitfalls.However, thesedifficultiesdonotjustifyrefrainingfromcollaboration.
